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This paper concerns treatment of variables in a dynamic semantics. The main empirical 
concern will be the interaction of presupposition and quantification, but I will also consider 
how epistemic modals and quantifiers combine. I will show how these empirical consid­
erations motivate a choice between two styles of quantification. The first of these styles 
involves treating quantified variables rather like discourse markers, whereas the second style 
gives variables a more classical interpretation. I will argue for the second, more conservative 
option. 
I will also argue that the solution is empirically superior to some other treatments of quan­
tified presuppositions, including those treatments which, in the current vogue, make heavy 
use of relatively unconstrained notions of accommodation. Such an argument of course de­
pends on there being a fact of the matter, a generally accepted picture of just what the data 
is regarding the interaction of presupposition and quantification. Unfortunately, there is 
considerable divergence of views across the presupposition literature, and there is not even 
one paper in which a serious attempt is made to systematically investigate the behavior 
of different presupposing constructions within different quantifiers and different discourse 
contexts. Indeed, of the existing discussions, all (that I am aware of) use decontextualised 
single sentences as the main source of data, and none include any indication that the deter­
mination of what various quantified sentences presuppose involved application of standard 
tests for presupposition. In the following section I will consider the empirical problem, 
before proceeding in the remainder of the paper with a theoretical analysis. The data is 
considered in greater detail in [Be93b] and in [Be:a] . 
1 Presupposit ion and Q uant ificat ion: The Dat a  
In what follows I will consider a range o f  examples involving two presuppositional construc­
tions: possessives and the semi-factive verb discover. The reader may well wonder whether 
other presuppositional constructions will behave the same way. I can only reply that I am 
interested in the very same question, but that an answer will have to await further investi­
gation. For instance, I strongly suspect that regarding the type of cases I will consider there 
is considerable variation amongst attitude verbs which presuppose the truth of their propo­
sitional argument, but I am not under the impression that this variation correlates with the 
factivejsemi-factive distinction of Karttunen. In [Be:a] I argue that much of the observed 
variation, possibly including the special first person behavior of semi-factives, is connected 
-Thanks go to Paul Dekker, Jeroen Groenendijk, Martin Stokhof and Frank Veltman, and to members 
of audiences at Alf .... Informatica Amsterdam, IMS Stuttgart, ITK Tilburg, OTS Utrecht and, of course, at 
SALT itself. 
© 1994 by David Beaver 
Mandy Harvey and Lynn Santelmann (eds.), SALT N 35-60, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University. 
36 David Beaver 
with issues of topic-focus articulation and discourse coherence, and not with presupposition 
per se. 
It is partly because of the interaction of these other factors that I have tried to give most of 
the examples to be considered together with some discourse context. However, the reader 
is to be warned that small variation in intonation can still affect the judgements concerning 
the examples below, though I will attempt to point out cases where this is a serious prob­
lem. Also, as an obvious point of methodology, giving too many of these examples to the 
same informant (or conference audience) in one sitting produces unpredictable results. For 
instance, salience of a set of car owning individuals in one example is likely to affect the 
reading of a following example presupposing car ownership. Despite these caveats, most, if 
not all, of the following data is quite robust, and this will be sufficient to contradict many 
of the assumptions that have been made elsewhere in the literaturel . 
1 . 1  Indefinites binding a trigger d o  not carry a universal presup­
position . 
Although this is not a contraversial point, it is worth making for two reasons. Firstly, because 
it should get the reader into the swing of the type of example to be considered, and secondly 
because the basic system introduced in [He83] , which provides the jumping off point for the 
technical developments in this paper, makes an incorrect prediction for these cases. In 
some of the following examples there may be several presupposing constructions, and bold 
emphasis will be used to indicate to the reader which clause contains the presupposition 
relevant to the discussion. In the following two examples the NP her car is bound by the 
indefinite a member of the tea m ,  and the factive VP discovered that the car's radiator had 
sprung a leak is bound by the indefinite a company car, respectively. It is clear that the 
italicized part of the first example is compatible with not every team member owning a car, 
and the italicized part of the second example is compatible with not every company car 
which someone in sales has having sprung a leak in the radiator. 
El H ow wi l l  everybody get t o  t h e  match? 
A member of the team came to the last match in her car, and she might aga i n ,  
but a l l  t h e  others wi l l  come b y  bike since they don't own cars. 
E2 How many employees had problems with thei r cars last year? 
H a rd ly a ny. There was somebody in sales with a company car who discovered 
that the car's radiator had sprung a leak, but that's a l l .  
I should make clear that in  deriving the general conclusion that "indefinites binding a trigger 
do not carry a universal presupposition" , I am trying to say that there will not be cases 
where such a universal inference is made. For instance, there could be uses of the italicized 
part of the second of these examples, especially with stress on discovered which license an 
inference that all the sales staff's company cars' radiators developed leaks. What I mean 
by "presupposition" here is something like "minimal precondition for interpretation" . Thus 
the fact that there are uses of the italicized part of the second example in contexts where 
the universal does not hold will be sufficient for me to conclude that there is no universal 
presupposition. Now, to take such a restrictive notion of presupposition is immediately 
1 1  have relied on a relatively amaIl set .of informant. (8) , half of whom ..... wered .... 18 question email 
questionnaire, and to the other half of whom 1 presented a amaIler selection of the examples verbally. 1 
dare say that to the average card carrying linguist this will seem like a hopelessly amaIl sample. Consider 
this section, if you will, a pilot study. For, 10 far as 1 am aware, nobody has ever conducted larger scale 
empirical work concerning the interaction of presuppositions .... d quantification: 1 comnot even find evidence 
of a researcher consistently bothering to ask any informants at all for their opinions of the data. Perhaps, it is 
not the sort of thing one talka about. Perhaps the prevalent use of de-contextualised single sentence examples 
has me .... t that it has been all but impossible to find informomts who would volunteer clear judgements. 
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to invite speculation as to what is the link between the notion of presupposition being 
employed here and the uses of the term elsewhere in the presupposition literature. For the 
moment, let us just say that what is at stake in this paper is what has been called "semantic 
presupposition" , and that a fuller theory, by detailing the links between this notion and that 
of "pragmatic presupposition" , should explain certain additional defeasible inferences that 
may arise with very similar examples to those considered here. A formal theory, very much 
in the spirit of Stalnaker's proposals [St74] , and which can be seen as an attempt to connect 
semantic and pragmatic notions of presupposition can be found in [Be93b] and [Be:b] . 
1 . 2  Triggers bound i n  the restrictor o f  a quantifier act a s  domain 
restrictors 
In the following 4-way example, the presupposition of car ownership occurs in the restrictor 
of a quantifier. It is clear that the discourse as a whole does not license any inference that 
every team member has a car . It appears that the presupposition of car ownership serves to 
restrict the domain of quantification to car owning individuals, so that the italicized clause 
must have a meaning equivalent to most(ffew/a l l/none) of the tea m members w h o  own a car 
and went to t h e  last match in it, wi l l  drive to this match . 
E3 How m a n y  tea m mem bers wi l l  drive to the match? 
I don't know whether all of the team members own a car, and I don't  know for su re h ow m a ny 
wi l l  drive. H owever, apparently most(ffewjalljnone) of the team members who went 
to the last match in their car, will drive to this match. I wou l d  guess that about 5 
wi l l  d rive in tota l .  
A similar comment applies t o  the following example. The discourse does not license an 
inference that every employee's car radiator sprang a leak last year, and we must conclude 
that the semi-factive discover is restricting the domain of quantification to individuals whose 
car radiators actually did spring a leak. 
E4 H ow m a n y  of your employees put antifreeze in their car radiators? 
I don't know whether a l l  of the employees own a car, a n d  I don't  know for sure how m a ny 
of them put a ntifreeze in the radiator. But, if my past experience is anything to go by, 
mostjfewjalljnone of the employees who discovered that their car radiators 
had sprung a leak last winter will remember to put antifreeze in this year. 
Space does not allow a detailed discussion of predictions derived elsewhere in the literature, 
but I will summarise the relevant properties of some of the more influential treatments. The 
claim that there is no universal presupposition for these cases is again in conflict with the 
predictions derivable in the basic system of [Be83] , although accords with the predictions 
in [C083] , [KP79] and [vdS92] . However, the Karttunen and Peters treatment would not 
give any prediction that the presupposition caused domain restriction, and would thus tend 
to give the wrong truth conditions. For instance, a l l  of the employees who d iscovered that 
their car radiators had sprung a leak last winter wi l l  remember to put a ntifreeze i n  this year 
would be false if some employees whose radiators did not develop leaks last year forget to 
put antifreeze in this year. 
1.3 Triggers b ound in the scope of a quantifier do not act as domain 
restrictors. 
The situation is different when the presupposition trigger is in the scope of the quantifier. 
The following two example discourses are completely bizarre: 
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E5 How m a n y  tea m members and cheerleaders wi l l  d rive to the match? 
Few of the 15 tea m members and  none of the 5 cheerleaders ca n d rive, but every team 
member will come to the match in her car. So expect about  4 to drive.  
E6 How m a n y  of you r  employees with com pany cars had problems with their car radiators last 
year? 
Although few of the sa les staff had a ny problems with their cars last year, all of the 
management discovered that their car radiators had sprung a leak. H owever, 
most of the m a n agement didn't have a single problem with their car radiator the whole 
year :  they are genera l ly  q uite conscientious a bout car mai nten a n ce .  
Why are these examples odd? Regarding the first of the two examples I suppose that the 
italicized proposition is incompatible with there being team members without a car or team 
members with a car who do not use it to come to the match, although these requirements 
are contradicted by the assertion that few of the team members can drive at all, and that 
only 4 will drive to the match. Similarly, the italicized clause in the second example seems 
to be incompatible with there being either members of management whose car radiators had 
no problems, or who failed to discover problems that arose, and the first of these is bluntly 
denied by the following claim that most of the m a nagement h a d  no problem with thei r car 
radiator. 
Neither [C083] , [KP79] or the basic system of [He83] provide any mechanism whereby a pre­
supposition in the scope could trigger domain restriction. However, the system in [vdS92] 
would allow "intermediate accommodation" to occur, so that at the level of discourse repre­
sentation the presupposition triggered in the scope is realised in the quantifier's restrictor. 
In other words, on van der Sandt's account, the italicized sentence in E5 would become 
a claim about the car owning team members, and the italicized sentence in E6 would be­
come a claim about those members of management whose car radiators had sprung a leak. 
One supposes that if the notion of accommodation introduced in [He83] were more fully 
developed, similar predictions would result2 • 
Van der Sandt 's prediction that a presupposition in the scope of a quantifier can trigger 
domain restriction is falsified by the oddity of the above examples. But could it just be 
something peculiar to these discourses that prevents domain restriction? Could it be that 
in these cases domain restriction would create a discourse that was incoherent for reasons 
independent of the presence of the presuppositional constructions? Unfortunately for the 
defender of van der Sandt's model, the answer to both of these questions is negative, and this 
may be shown by considering two slight variants on the original examples. The following two 
example discourses are both perfectly reasonable, if somewhat involved. They differ from 
the originals only by the addition of an explicit restrictive clause. Clearly, if the explicit 
addition of a domain restriction produces a coherent discourse, it is not open to claim that 
without these clauses an implicit domain restriction results in incoherence3 • 
2 See [Ze92] for a development of Heim'. ideas. But this development i. made with hindsight as to 
how van der Sandt went about .olving a similar problem, and it is by no means clear that it i. faithful 
to the original rather vaguely specified conception of Heim. In particular, in Zeevat's development what 
is accommodated i. precisely what i. presupposed, whereas Heim tells me that the idea she had in mind 
involved a more subtle pragmatically driven link between what is presupposed and what is accommodated. 
However, [HeB3] i. wholly ambiguous on this point - I must admit that I had originally read it ,.ith much 
the same interpretation in mind as Zeevat managed to formalise. 
• I also tried out venio"" of these examples with an extrapooed restrictive clause: 
1. How many team members and cheerleaders will drive to the match? 
Few of the 15 team members and none of the 5 cheerleaders can drive, but every team member will 
come to the match in her car, if she owns one. So expect about 4 to drive. 
2.  How many of your employees had problems with their car radiators last year? 
Although few of the sales stafT had any problems with their cars last year, all of the management 
discovered that their car radiators had sprung a leak, if they had failed to put antifreeze in.  
However, most of the management didn't have a single problem with their car radiator the whole year: 
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E7 H ow many team members and cheer leaders wi l l  d rive to the match? 
Few of the 15 team members and none of the 5 cheerleaders ca n d rive, but every car­
owning team member will come to the match in her car. So exp ect about 4 
to drive. 
E8 H ow many of your employees had problems with thei r car radiators last year? 
Although few of the sa les staff had any problems with thei r cars last year ,  all of the 
management whose car radiators sprang a leak discovered that their car 
radiators had sprung a leak. H owever, most of the management d idn 't have a single 
problem with their car radiator the whole year :  they are genera l l y  q uite conscientious about 
car mai ntenance. 
1 . 4  Triggers bound i n  t h e  scope o f  a quantifier d o  not result i n  a 
universal semantic presupposition. 
We have seen that presuppositions in the scope of a quantifier cannot trigger domain restric­
tion. It is often claimed (eg. [He83] , [Ei93] )  that a universal presupposition results in such 
cases. How can this hypothesis be tested? Firstly, observe that a simple positive assertion 
with a universal quantifier does lead to a universal inference concerning satisfaction of the 
presupposition. For instance, every tea m member turned up to the match in her own car will, 
in contexts which do not license domain restriction to car owners, lead to an inference that 
every team member has a car. However, the following examples indicate that the universal 
negative quantifiers no and none of t h e  do not lead to such a universal inference. In the 
first of the following two examples, it is plausible that not every team member owns a car, 
and in the second it is clear that none of the management had any problems with their car 
radiators: 
E9 H ow many team members and cheer lea ders wi l l  d rive to the match? 
A few of the 15 tea m members a n d  none of the 5 cheerleaders can drive, b ut no team 
member will come to the match in her own car. 
EI0 How many of your  employees with com p a ny cars had problems with their car radiators last 
year? 
Although a few of the sales staff d iscovered problems with thei r car radiators last year, 
none of the management discovered that their car radiators had sprung 
even a single leak. The reason that none of the management hade a single problem 
with their car radiator is that they are genera l ly  q u ite conscientious a bout car mainten a n ce .  
Given that in a simple assertion of a sentence with a universal positive quantifier there 
is an inference to universal satisfaction of the scopal presuppositions by objects in the 
domain of quantification, can we say whether this universal inference is itself to be thought 
of as a presupposition? So far as I know, there has been no serious attempt to answer 
this question. The obvious approach is to try the standard presupposition tests based on 
inheritance through embedding contexts. Of the next four examples, the first two involve 
an embedding in the antecedent of a conditional, and the second two use negation. Of these 
tests, the conditional test is generally to be preferred, because of the difficulty in saying just 
what the negation of a universally quantified sentence is. Sentence external negation ( it is  not 
they are generally quite conscientious about car maintenance. 
All infonnants preferred these to the original E5 and E6, and some thought they were absolutely fine. 
However, three of eight informants co=ented that the (1)  and (2) were still a bit awkward. Perhaps the 
extraposed relative forces them to back-track. When presenting (1 ) or (2)  verbally, reactions are certainly 
sensitive to rhythm and intonation: stress on the if of the extraposed restrictor helps. 
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the case that . . .  ) is troublesome because it is often associated with cases of presupposition 
denial, and I have settled for an NP-internal negation. 
All of the following four examples are judged felicitous. However, in the first and third cases, 
it is clear from the discourse that some of the team members might not own a car, and in 
the second and fourth examples, there are managers whose car radiator did not develop a 
leak4. 
E 1 1  How many tea m members wi l l  d rive to the match? 
I don't know for sure whether al l  of the team members own a car, and I don 't know for s u re 
how many wi l l  d rive. But, usua l l y  one or two(!only one or two) go by publ ic  tra nsport, so 
if every{ /no) team member turns up to the match in her own car, I'll be 
surprised. 
E12 Do you expect any  of your employees to have prob lems with thei r car radiators n ext year? 
Usua l ly  there are one or two(!on ly one or two) p eople who forget to put antifreeze i n  their  
cars .  So if nobody{/everybody) discovers that their radiator has a leak this 
year, I'll be surprised. 
E13  Wil l  everybody on the team need their  parking spaces this season , or do you t h i n k  I c a n  
u s e  one? 
Last season the whole team used to d rive to matches. But I suspect that this season there 
might be  one or two that don't even own a car. Given a lso the recent pre- match traffic 
jams,  I th ink  its safe to say that not every team member will come to the match 
in her car. So I guess we' l l  be a b l e  to fin d  you a spare p lace. 
E14 I n  the big freeze last year, al l the com p a n y  cars had radiator prob lems, and m a ny of the  
sa les staff com p l a ined about bei n g  given cars wh ich  were poorly maintained . Do you t h i nk 
the same wi l l  h a ppen again? 
It's possib le .  But recently we've been using a new product i n  al l  our cars, a chemical  
which when added to the radiator top- u p  tank, s lowly re-seals any holes which form .  So, 
regard l ess of w hether everybody's car  a ctua l ly  does develop radiator problems, I ' m  j ust 
a bout certa i n  that not everybody will discover that their car radiator has a 
leak this year, a n d  I expect far fewer compla i nts .  
Since embedded versions of  universal sentences appear not to  carry any of the universal im­
plications of the simple sentences, I conclude that the simple sentences do not carry universal 
presuppositions. In the later technical presentation the purported universal presuppositions 
of the simple sentences will be analysed as entailments rather than presuppositions. 
1 . 5  Donkey b ound presuppositions d o  not trigger (modal o r  quan­
tificational) domain restriction 
In van der Sandt's model a presupposition arising in the consequent of a conditional can be 
accommodated in the antecedent of the conditional. Thus he would predict that a sentence if 
someone's in  the team ,  she comes to m a tches in her car has a reading equivalent to if someone 
41 should point out that of all the examples considered in this paper, these four caused me the most 
trouble. Slight variants tend to send informants into panic mode, and in presenting examples in spoken form, 
intonation was critical, although 1 am unable to report any definite conclusions as to the how intonation 
affects acceptability in these cases. This sensitivity arises partly because of the complexity of applying 
embedding tests to sentences that are already semantically complex, involving universal quantification. But 
1 have to say that there could well be other factors, and that of all my empirical conclusions, the claim that 
universals with & presupposition in the scope do not themselves carry a universal presupposition is the one 
1 would most readily drop. Note also that it would be straightforward to adapt the technical system to be 
presented later 80 as to accord with a claim of universal presupposition. 
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who owns a car is in the tea m ,  she comes to m atches in her car. One would also expect 
a development of the accommodation model of Heim to lead to this sort of prediction 5 .  
However, i t  i s  clear from the following examples that such this type of accommodation leads 
to the false prediction that the following two discourses have a felicitous reading, when 
informants are uniformly unable to make any sense of them at all: 
E15 How many team mem bers and  cheerleaders wi l l  drive to the match? 
Few of the 15 tea m members and  none of the 5 cheerleaders ca n d rive, b ut if someone's 
in the team, she comes to matches in her car. So expect about 4 cars. 
E16 How many of you r  employees had problems with their car radiators last year? 
Nearly all the com pany cars su rvived the entire year without any problems with the radiator. 
However, if an employee's car was inspected regularly, it was eventually 
discovered that the radiator had sprung a leak. In these few isolated cases, we 
sacked the employee. 
As with sentences E5 and E6, it is straightforward to show that the reason for the infelicity is 
not because accommodation leads to an incoherent discourse, but because accommodation 
does not happen. We simply find a minimal variant on the original example where the 
material van der Sandt would claim can be accommodated is added as an explicit restrictive 
clause, as in the following case: 
E17 How many of you r  e m ployees had problems with their car radiators l ast year? 
N early a l l  the com pa ny cars su rvived the entire year without any problems with the radiator. 
However, if an employee's car was inspected regularly, it was eventually 
discovered that the radiator had sprung a leak, if indeed it had done so. I n  
these few isolated cases, w e  sacked t h e  employee. 
Note that it is difficult to test whether the universal inference (to car ownership by team 
members) arising from sentences like if someone's in the team,  she comes to m atches in her  car 
is in fact a presupposition. There are no tests for presupposition that can easily be applied 
to a conditional sentence. 
1 . 6  Unbound presuppositions syntactically within t h e  restrictor or 
scope of a quantifier which cannot express negation are pro­
jected . 
I have argued that bound presupposing constructions in the scope of a quantifier do not 
lead to universal presuppositions. However, presuppositions arising within quantificational 
constructions do not simply disappear. Consider the case of a presupposed closed proposition 
occurring in the scope of a quantifier: 
E18 Is the company l i kely to remain solvent this year, and how does this relate to projected 
staff tu rn over? 
I don't know whether the com pany fi nances are hea lthy or not, but every employee who 
has discovered that the com pany is goi ng bankrupt is looking for another job. 
This discourse is not felicitous, presumably because the claim that the speaker does not know 
whether company finances are healthy is in contradiction with the clear inference that the 
company is going bankrupt. Replacement of the presupposition trigger with a non-factive 
expression produces an acceptable discourse: 
• A. indeed i. the c .... e in [Ze92]. 
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E19 Is the company l i kely to rema i n  solvent this year,  and  how d o es this relate to p roj ected 
staff tu rn over? 
I don't know whether the com pany finances are hea lthy or not, but every e m p l oyee who 
has  come to bel ieve that  the com pany is  goi ng ban krupt is looking for a nother  j o b .  
It  is  interesting to observe that E18 provides another difficulty for accommodation models. 
For in such a model (van der Sandt's or Heim's) , the proposition that the company is going 
bankrupt may be accommodated into the (discourse representation of) the restrictor the 
quantifier. In van der Sandt's model, this would lead to a DRS for the quantification like 
the following: 
[x: going-bankrupt( c ) ,employee(x) ,discover(x,going-bankrupt( c» ) �[looking-for-a-job(x») 
On standard DRT semantics, this has a meaning equivalent to if the comp a n y  is  goi ng 
bankrupt then everybody who has d iscovered it is looking for another job.  This is a perfectly 
reasonable meaning for a sentence to have, but it is by no means the meaning of everybody 
who discovered that the company is going bankrupt is looking for a nother job . .  I conclude that 
either a model of presupposition must be developed not involving presupposition-triggered 
local accommodation, or else van der Sandt's model must be altered so that local accom­
modation is much more restricted. I will pursue the first option. 
2 Technical Preliminaries 
To show how the data from the previous section can be dealt with, I will introduce a family 
of dynamic logics based on the system presented in [He83) , but extending and modifying it 
in various ways6. The models for Heimian logics can be seen as sets of first order models 
(the elements of W) defined over a constant domain 'D: 
Definition D1 (Models) ('D,  W, 1 1 . 1 1 ) 
The use of a fixed domain does not represent any philosophical commitment, but allows 
technical simplification. 
We begin with the notions in [He83) of a sequence, which is a partial variable assignment, 
and a world-sequence pair. A sequence maps each variable either onto an element of the 
domain or onto the emptyset, which is assumed not to be a member of the domain. The 
domain of a sequence is the set of all variables not mapped onto the emptyset by that 
sequence. The domain of a world-sequence pair is just the domain of the sequence, and 
in terms of sequence domains and world-sequence pair domains, a notion of eztension is 
introduced. One sequence or world-sequence pair extends (�) another just in case all the 
valuations that the first gives to variables in its domain are preserved in the second, although 
the second may have a larger domain. World-sequence pairs can be extended by adding a 
new assignment: if pair i differs from j by the addition of the assignment of the variable z 
to d (i > .. :<1 j, then i and j agree on the values of all variables apart from z, z is not in the 
domain of j, and the sequence in i maps z onto d. 
60ekker's EOPL [De93] ,  which combines idea form [GS91a] and [He83] provide. much of the technical 
inspiration for this reformulation. See also [Be92]. 
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Definition D2 ( Sequences; World-Sequence Pairs) (j,g,h; i,j,k) 
SEQ 
domain(f) 
domain( (w , f) ) 
f ? g 
(w , f) ? (w' , g) 
(w, f) >,,:d (w' , g) 
(V u {0}) VAR 
{v E VAR I f(v) :f. 0} 
= domain(f) 
iff "Iv E domain(g) f(v) = g(v) 
ifof w = w' /\ f ?  9 
iff w = w' /\ "Iv :f. :ef(v) = g(v) /\ g(:e) = 0 /\  f(:e) = d 
A Heimian context, or information state, is a set of world-sequence pairs in which all the 
sequences have the same domain7• The domain of an information state is defined as the 
domain of its elements. Also useful later will be an information subtraction operation (\) 
analogous to set subtraction. The result of subtracting one state from another is the subset 
of world-sequence pairs in the first which do not have extensions in the second. 
Definition D3 (Information) (I,J,K) 
INFO 
domain(I) 
I \V = 
{I E 2wx SEQ I 36 'v'i E I domain(i) = 6} 
{v E V ARI I 3 (w , f) E I v E domain(f)} 
{i E I I ...,3j E J j ? i} 
It is natural to define a partial ordering of precedence (::5) over information states, such that, 
intuitively, one state precedes another if the second contains at least as much information 
as the first. In Stalnaker's model of assertion [St79] information increase corresponds to the 
elimination of possible worlds. In the current setting, there are two ways to gain information: 
world-sequence pairs can be eliminated, and new variables can be added to the domain. 
Thus one state precedes another if the set of world-sequence pairs in the second contains 
only extensions of world-sequence pairs in the first. I will not discuss in detail the algebraic 
structure imposed on the set of information states INFOby the precedence ordering, save 
to point out that there are unique top and bottom elements. The bottom, [j], is a state 
of blissful ignorance, that state which informationally precedes all others: it is the set of 
all pairs of a world and the sequence with null domain. The top 1 : -( 1 is simply the empty 
set , and can be thought of as absurdity, for it represents the state arrived in after accepting 
contradictory information, so that there no longer remain any possible worlds compatible 
with all the accepted information. 
Definition D4 (The Structure of INFO) 
I ::5 J  
GJ GJ 
iff Vj E J 3i E I j ? i 
= { (w , f) E INFO I domain(f) = 0} 
o 
The following obvious properties, of which the formula 1 : -) 1 ::5 1  : -( 1 is a memorable corollary, 
say as much as I intend to about the algebraic structure of INFO: 
7The possibility of allowing the domains of the component world-sequence pairs presents an interesting 
vista. For instance, a sentence like a wolf might come to the door could introduce a variable which was only 
in the domain of those world-sequence pairs where, in the given world, a wolf actually does come to the 
door. I will not pursue this here. 
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VI E INFO 
VI E INFO 
David Beaver 
At the heart of the system in [HeS3] is the notion of a Context Change Potential (CCP). 
Formulae of Heimian logics will be interpreted as CCP's, which are defined here as binary 
relations between contexts. If a pair of information states (I, J) is in the denotation of a 
formula, then the formula provides a way of updating an input state I to produce the output 
J. This definition of CCP allows more generality than will be used in any of the systems 
presented in this paper, since it is possible for a single input of a CCP to have multiple 
outputs, when in fact no formula of a Heimian logic will have this property8 . 
Definition D5 ( Context Change Potentials) CCP = 2INFOx INFO 
Having established the semantic realm in which formulae are to be interpreted, it is now 
possible to introduce some standard logical notions, and also some less standard ones. We 
begin with the notions of satisfaction and entailment: 
Definition D6 (Satisfaction) 
I F 4> iff VJ, i (I[4>]J I\ i  E I) -+ (3j j  � i l\ j E J) 
Definition D7 (Entailment) 
An information state I satisfies a formula 4> if updating I with 4> does not eliminate any 
world-sequence pairs, although it may extend them. Note the use of 1[4>]1 to mean that 
the pair (I, J) stand in the update relation given by the interpretation of 4>. A sequence of 
premise formulae entail a single conclusion if updating any information state sequentially 
with all the premises yields a state which satisfies the conclusion. Note that since CCP'S are 
defined as binary relations between inputs and outputs, sequential update is just relational 
composition (0) , such that an input I can be sequentially updated with with 4> and then "if; 
to produce J just in case 1[4>] 0 ["if;] J . See [Ve91] for more on the definition of entailment 
in a dynamic setting. 
Truth tends not to be a central notion in dynamic logics, but the semantics of attitude 
predicates will be essentially static with respect to their propositional argument. A static 
notion of truth with respect to a world and an assignment will thus be useful. The following 
notion of truth, which says that a formula is true with respect to a world-sequence pair if 
an extension of the pair is contained in some possible output of the formula, is by no means 
the only one possible9 • 
8 In  (Be93a] the full relationality of CCP's is used to introduce limited non-determinism into the inter­
pretation of language, providing a semantic model of non-deterministic pronoun resolution, as found in 
[Kam8l] . Thus if an input information state contains two variables in its domain which are established to 
correspond to females, then a sentence containing the pronoun she will have at least two outputs, since the 
pronoun can be resolved to either variable. 
9 The reason for considering extensions of the world-sequence pair has to do with the possibility of the 
formula introducing new variables. For instance, the formula corresponding to a man walks will be satisfied 
in a world-sequence pair with an empty domain, but where at least one man walks in the given world, in 
spite of the fact that all non-absurd outputs of the formula have a non-empty domain, containing a variable 
established to be a walking man. 
When Variables Don't Vary Enough 
Definition DB (Truth) 
tP i8 true wrt i iff 31, J I[tP] J A 3; � i ; E J 
A formula is tautologous if it is satisfied in every information state. It is easily shown that 
tautologies are true with respect to any world-sequence pair: 
Definition D9 (Tautology) 
tP i8 a tautology iff V I I 1= tP 
A formula can be persistent, in the sense that if it is satisfied in some state, then it is 
also satisfied in all more informative states. All of the systems to be presented will be 
non-monotonic, in the sense that there will be some formulae which are not persistent. 
Definition DlO (Persistence) 
tP i8 persi8tent iff VI, J (I 1= tP A I :;  J) - (J 1= tP) 
Finally we arrive at the essense of the CCP model of presupposition, the notions of admi8sion 
and of presupposition itself. Although CCP's in Heimian logics do not occupy the full space 
of binary relations between states, they still occupy a larger space than the one-to-one 
functions. In general, the CCP of a formula will be equivalent to a partial function, with 
domain, or input, given by the set of states occurring as first coordinates of the relation, 
and range, similarly, given by the set of states occurring as second coordinates. Crucially, 
there may be some states which are not in the domain of the update function corresponding 
to a formula. In this case, it is said that these states fail to admit the formula, since the 
meaning of the formula provides no update from them: 
Definition Dll  (Admission) 
I admits tP iff 3J I[tPP 
Presuppositions are preconditions for update. The presuppositions of a formula are all those 
formulae that must be satisfied in order for update to occur. In other words, a formula tP 
presupposes another formula .,p if .,p is satisfied in every state in the domain of the update 
function given by tP. Since the states in the domain of a formula's update function are just 
those which admit the formula, we arrive at the following definition: 
Definition Dl2 (Presupposition) 
tP presupposes .,p iff VI (I admits 4» - I 1= .,p 
Definition Dl3 (Presupposition Failure) 
The presuppositions of 4> fail in the state I iff -.(1 admits tP) 
(I i8 called a dead-end.) 
There has been much controversy in the presupposition literature over the relation between 
presupposition and entailment. Although I will refrain from entering into the debate here10 , 
it may still be useful to state the formal relation between presupposition and entailment in 
the logics to be considered: 
Fact F2 (Presupposition and Entailment) If tP presupposes .,p and .,p i8 persi8tent, then 
tP I= .,p. 
10 But see (Be:c] .  
45 
46 David Beaver 
3 Heimian Predicate Logic - First Version 
The language of HPL is an extension of FOPL with equality, definite descriptions and 
attitude predicates, the latter two being included as sources of presupposition. Attitude 
predications in HPL split into two further classes, factive and non-factive, factive attitude 
predications being syntactically distinguished by underlining, ego regret"(z, 1/1). 
Definition D14 (Syntax of HPL) Given variables V, n-ary predicates pn and attitude 
predicates P", the language 01 HPL is given by recursion over the lollowing rewrite rules: 
DET => THE 
FORM => pn(V1 ,  . . . •  Vn) I P"(V. FORM) I P"(V, FORM ) I (Vi = V; )  I 
3V I '<IV FORM I (DET(V, FORM , FORM) I 
(FORM A FORM) I (FORM V FORM) I (FORM -> FORM) I (-,FORM) I 
The semantics of HPL formulae is defined recursively in the normal fashion, the base of the 
recursion being n-ary non-attitudinal predications and equality statementsll . Consider the 
case of a unary predication P(z). Which world-sequence pairs are compatible with such a 
predication? Presumably those pairs for which the sequence maps the variable z onto an 
object which is in the extension of the predicate P in the world. So, we can say that a pair 
(w. /) is compatible with the predication P(z) just in case I(z) E I IP l iw '  Extending to the 
case of an n-ary predication. (w. /) is compatible with the predication P(Zl • . . . •  zn) just in 
case (/(zl ) • . . .  , I(zn)) E I IP l i w '  The following clause says that a state 1 can be updated 
with an n-ary predication to yield a state J just in case all the predicated variables are 
defined in 1 (ie. are in its domain) .  and J is the subset of world-sequence pairs in 1 which 
are compatible with the predication: 
Definition D15 (Simple Predication) 
I[P(Zl . . . . .  Zn)]J iff {Zl • . . . •  zn} � domain(l) A 
J = {(w. /) E l l (/(zl ) , · ·  . •  /(Zn)) E I IP l l w} 
Equality statements z = y, likewise. only define an update on a state if both variables are 
in its domain. in which case the output is the subset of world-sequence pairs in the input 
state for which the sequence maps both variables onto the same object: 
Definition D16 (Equality) 
l[z = y] J iff {z. y} � domain(l) /\ J = ( (w, /) E l l I(z) = I(y)} 
The static extension of an attitude predicate is a set of pairs, where the first element of the 
pair is an individual. and the second is a set of worlds. For a world-sequence pair (w. I) 
11 To get a feeling for how the semantic. works it might be useful to conoider how the basic idea of 
Stalnaker' . ..  sertion model would translate into the current approach. For Stalnaker, an information state 
is just a set of worlds, and update of a state with an atomic proposition is just given by reIDoving those 
worlds from the state which are not compatible with the proposition. If I IPI ! is the set of worlds where p 
holds, the following HPL-like semantic clause results: 
I[p] J iff J = I n  I IPI !  
This can be  read .. ·1 can updated with p to yield J just in case J is the intersection of I and the set of 
worlds where p holds. 
When Variables Don't Vary Enough 
to be compatible with an attitudinal predication P"(z, �), the extension of the predicate at 
w must include (I(z),  {w' I � is true wrt (w', I}}). Updating with a non-factive attitudinal 
predication P"(z, �), analogously to the simple predication case, is only possible if the 
variable z is in the domain of the input state, in which case the output is that subset of the 
world-sequence pairs of the input which are compatible with the predication: 
Definition Dl7 (Non-factive Attitudes) 
I[P"(z, �)]J iff z E domain(I) /\ 
J = {(w, I) E I I (I(z),  {w' I � is true wrt (w' , I}}) E I IP" l l w} 
Factive attitudinal predications are defined in terms of non-factive attitudinal predications, 
with the sole addition of a constraint only allowing update to occur if the propositional 
argument is satisfied in the input12 : 
Definition Dl8 (Factive attitudes) 
I[P"(z, �)] J iff I F= � /\ I[P"(z, �)]J 
The connectives offer no surprises to those familiar with other dynamic systems. Conjunc­
tion is defined in terms of relational composition, such that updating with � /\ .,p  has the 
same effect as updating with � and then updating with .,p. Updating a formula with the 
negation of � produces a state containing all those world-sequence pairs in the input which 
do not have extensions in the state obtained by updating with � itself. Note the use of 
the state-complement operation \ introduced earlier. Implication and dijunction are de­
fined using classical equivalences, although, this being a dynamic logic, it is significant that 
equivalences are chosen which maintain the order of the arguments. 
Definition Dl9 (Connectives) 
[� /\ .,p] 
I[...,�] J 
[� -+ .,p) 
[� v .,p] 
= [�] 0 [.,p] 
iff 3K I[tP] K  /\ J = I \\K 
= [...,(� /\ ...,.,p)] 
= [...,(...,tP /\ ...,.,p)] 
In [Be83] , as in [Be82] and [Kam81] , a radically non-quantificational view of indefinites 
is espoused. As for quantificational determiners, indefinites introduce variables, and the 
syntactic restrictor and scope (typically a CN and a VP respectively) are taken, semantically, 
to predicate properties of this variable, but the indefinite is not seen as having any intrinsic 
quantificational force. The apparent quantificational force of an indefinite derives entirely 
from the context in which it is used. In the last five years, particularly through the work 
of Groenendijk and Stokhof13, it has become clear that the idea underlying this radical 
analysis of indefinites can be regarded not as being non-quantificational, but as utilising an 
alternative approach to quantification. The essence of the approach is random eztension, 
the addition to an information state of a variable which is completely underspecified as to 
its value. 
To evaluate a sentence a wom a n  is wa l ki ng, a variable with unspecified value is added, and 
then the value of this variable is restricted to be in the extension of wom a n  and wa l king. 
12 It i. thuo auumed that aJJ. factive predicate. can be defined in terms of underlying non-factive predicates. 
Whilst I cannot lee a clear counter-example to this assumption. l have to say that the only reason for making 
it here i. technical simplicity: it is neither natural nor empiricaJJ.y motivated. In [Be93b] . however. a more 
abstract treatment of attitudinal predications il given which does not necessitate such a commitment. 
U See [GS91a]. [Ch92] . (De93] . 
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This procedure will have two effects. Firstly, it will cause the removal of any world-sequence 
pairs in the input where the extensions of woma n  and wa lking have an empty intersection. 
Secondly, provided there are at least some world-sequence pairs remaining in the output, 
they will all be defined for the variable z, and map it onto objects which are walking women. 
The fact that z is defined in the output state means that it can behave as a discourse marker, 
with reuse of z in later sentences having the effect of anaphoric reference. 
Adding a variable z with unspecified value to a state I produces a new state J (notated 
I +" J) containing any world-sequence pair which adds to one in the original state an 
assignment to the variable in question: 
Definition D20 (Random Extension) 
1 +" J iff z � domain(l) " J = {j I 3d E 'D3i E I j >,,:d i} 
The existential quantification over objects d in the domain means that for any object in the 
domain, there is some world-sequence pair in J such that the sequence maps z onto that 
object, and in this sense the value of z could be called unspecified, random, or, perhaps, 
arbitrary. We obtain the following definitions for existential and, using the standard duality, 
universal quantification: 
Definition D21 (Random extension based pseudo-quantifiers) 
l[3z cP]J 
[VZ cP] 
iff I +"o[cP] J 
= [...,3z ""cP] 
Are these really quantifiers? Relating the HPL quantifiers to the standard meta-language 
notions could provide reassurance: 
Fact F3 (Pseudo-quantifiers are quantificational) 
I p 3zpz 
I p '<lzpz 
iff (z � domain(l) " '<1(10, f) E I 3d E 'D(d) E I I P I I . 
iff (z � domain(l) " '<1(10, f) E I '<Id E 'D(d) E I IP I I . 
3 . 1  Examples 
Let us consider a rather restricted model M in which the domain 'D = {a, b, c} , and there 
are two worlds: W = 101, 102 . Let us say that in both worlds, both a and b are men, but 
c is a woman, so, using a predicate M for "man" , I IMI I. = {a, b} for 10 = 101, 102. Let us 
say further that a is broke (predicate B) in both worlds, but b is only broke in 101: we 
will not investigate c's financial situation until later. The only remaining detail we need 
for noe is that whilst b is fully aware of his financial situation in every world, a has only 
discovered (predicate D) the seriousness of his financial plight in world 102 , but in 101 remains 
blissfully ignorant. States will be represented using the notation 101 (z : a, Y : b) for the pair 
consisting of the world 101 and the sequence mapping z onto a and y onto b. So for M ,  
1 : -) 1 = {W1 () , W2 ()}. 
E20 A m a n  is broke. 
HPL Translation: 3zM(z) " B(z) 
Denotation: A function from states where z is undefined to states consisting of 
world-sequence pairs (10, f) which extend pairs on the input with by having z 
defined, and where z is mapped onto an object which is in the extension of Man 
and Broke, ie. fez) E I I Mi l. n I IB I I. · 
When Variables Don't Vary Enough 
Sample Update: I : -) I f-+ {Wl (Z : a} , Wl(Z : b} , W2 (Z : a}} 
Another Sample Update: {W2 (}} f-+ I : -( I (Note that this is not a case of 
presupposition failure. The update is defined, but happens to lead to a state 
containing no world-sequence pairs. )  
Sample Dead-end: {Wl (Z : a}} (because z is  in its domain) 
E21 He has discovered that he is broke. 
HPL Translation: D(z, B(z)) 
Denotation: For an individual 0 to have discovered that (s)he is broke in a world 
w, we must have that the pair consisting of 0 and the set of worlds where 0 is 
Broke be in the extension of Discover at w, ie (0 , {w' I 0 E I IDI I  • . ) E I ID I I  • .  
The formula D(  z, B( z ) )  denotes a function from states where z i s  broke to  states 
where z is broke and has discovered it. More formally, D(z, B(z)) is a function 
from states which contain only world-sequence pairs (w, f) where z is mapped 
onto an individual in the extension of B (ie. fez) E I IB I I . ) to that subset of those 
pairs where (f(z) , {w' I fez) E I ID I I .·} E I ID I I  • . 
Sample Update: {Wl (Z : a} , wl (z : b} , W2(Z : a}} f-+ {Wl (Z : b) , W2 (Z : a}} 
Sample Dead-end: {Wl (Z : a} , w2 (z : b} , W2 (Z : a}} (because B(z) is not satisfied 
in the input) 
E22 A m a n  is broke. He has discovered that he is broke. 
HPL Translation: (3zM(z) 1\ B(z)) 1\ D(z, B(z))  
Denotation: The sequencing of 3zM(z) I\ B (z)  and D(z,  B(z) ) ,  thus a function from 
states where z is not defined to states where z is mapped to an individual that 
is a broke man who has discovered that he is broke. 
Sample Update: I : -) I f-+ {Wl (Z : b} , W2 (Z : a}} 
Sample Dead-end: {Wl (Z : a}} (because z is in its domain) 
E23 A m a n  has discovered that he is broke. 
HPL Translation: 3zM(z) 1\ D(z, B(z)) 
Denotation: Break this down into two updates, firstly ofan initial state with 3zM(z) 
to produce an intermediate state, and secondly of this state with D(z, B(z)) to 
produce the final output. The first takes a state not having z in its domain to a 
state containing every z-extension of an input world-sequence pair such that z is 
mapped onto an object in the extension of Man. 
Update with D(z, B(z)) can proceed if and only if B(z) is satisfied at this point, 
so that for every world-sequence pair (w,  f) in the intermediate state, the object 
fez) must be in the extension of Broke at w. This will be the case if and only 
if for every world-sequence pair in the initial state, the extension of Man at 
the world is a subset of the extension of Broke. Thus the complete formula, 
3zM(z) 1\ D( z, B(z ) ) ,  is a function from states not having z in their domain and 
where for every world, the extension of Broke includes the extension of Man to 
states where z is established to be a Broke Man who has Discovered that he is 
Broke. 
Sample Update: {Wl (} } f-+ {Wl (Z : a}} 
Sample Dead-end: I :  -) I (because in W2 there is a man who is not broke, so that the 
extension of B does not include the extension of M. Thus no update is defined 
from the intermediate state onwards, and so the update as a whole is undefined. )  
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3 . 2  Presupp osition Projection i n  HPL 
Although this paper is concerned primarily with the interaction of presupposition and quan­
tification, it is as well to note that regarding more general presupposition properties, HPL 
behaves much as one would expect a Karttunen-derived model of presupposition to behave14•  
Note the occurrence of conditionalised presuppositions when a presupposition is triggered in 
the second conjunct of a conjunction or in the consequent of an implication, and also observe 
that (3) demonstrates the relation with a standard semantic definition of presupposition in 
terms of negation. The following fact will hold for all the systems introduced in this paper: 
Fact F4 (Karttunen-style Presupposition Projection) 
1. pa(z, IP) prell'IJ.ppOlleB IP 
e. II IP  prell'IJ.ppOBell .,p then: 
(a) ...,tP, tP I\ .,p, IP -+ .,p and IP v .,p  all prell'IJ.ppOlle .,p 
(b) X 1\ IP, X -+ tP and X V IP all prell'IJ.ppOlle X --+ IP 
3. Given that .,p ill persilltent, 
(IP I= .,p and ...,1P 1= .,p) iff IP pre8'IJ.ppOllell .,p 
More pertinent to the aims of this paper is the fact that, as seen in example E23 above, 
when a presupposition trigger is bound by an indefinite, a universal presupposition results: 
Fact F5 (Heimian projection from quantified contexts)  II IP  prell'IJ.ppOllell .,p, then:15 
3z IP prell'IJ.ppOllell 'tIz .,p 
'tIz IP prell'IJ.ppOllell 'tIz .,p 
These results are both in conflict with the conslusions of §2,  the result that existentially 
quantified propositions yield universal presuppositions being most clearly at variance with 
our intuitions. 
14 Which is not to say that the various modela put forward in [Kar73, Kar14, KP19] all have the same 
projection properties. See [Be:c] for discuaaion. Also, see [Be93b] for a defense of the properties in F4. 
a For proof, suppose I/> presupposes .p .and '" IE domain(I): 
(1 ) I admits 3"' 1/> hypothesis 
(2) 3J 1 + .. J 1\ J admits I/> dem. of 3, '" IE domain( I) 
(3) 3J I +.. J 1\ J F .p dem. of admiosion 
(4) 3J  I +c J 1\ J[.p1 1 : -( I defna. of F, � 
(5) 1(3", �.p11 : -( I dem. of 3 
(6) I[�3�1I dem. of � 
(1) I F """" defna. of F, "  
This establishes that 3 ",  I/> presupposes "", .p. The second proposition e&D b e  seen from the fact that the 
admission conditions of 3., I/> and "", I/> are identical, all the following steps being reversible ( the assumption 
that ., IE domain(I) .till holds) :  
(1 ) I admits �3., �I/> hypothesis 
(2) I admits 3., �I/> dem. of � 
(3) 3J 1 + .. J 1\ J admits �I/> dem. of 3 
(4) 3J 1 + .. J 1\ J admits I/> defn. of � 
(5) I admit. 3", 1/> dem. of 3 
When Variables Don't Vary Enough 
4 Extending the Problem 
Before suggesting a solution to the problem, I will attempt to generalise it in two direc­
tions, extending the language of HPL but maintaining, for the moment, the semantics of 
the HPL fragment of the extensions. Firstly I will show how the random-extension based 
approach to quantification in HPL can be extended to cover binary quantifier relations. We 
will see that the binary quantifiers so defined have comparable presupposition projection 
properties to the unary quantifiers in HPL, and are thus also at variance with the empirical 
claims of §2 .  Secondly I will introduce modal operators along the lines of the treatment 
of epistemic modality in [Ve91] ,  and we will see that problems occur when variables are 
quantified-in to modal contexts. These problems, though unconnected with presupposition 
in that they would still occur in a version of the logic which did not involve presupposition 
introducing constructions, are analogous to those occurring when presupposition triggers 
are bound by quantifiers. Put "another way, quantifying-in to modal contexts is comparable 
with quantifying-in to presupposition triggers, and produces similar problems. This will 
suggest a single solution to both problems. 
4 . 1  Heimian Quantifier Logic - First Version 
Definition D22 ( Syntax of HQL) A6 for HPL but with. th.e following additional rewrite 
rule: 
DET ==> SOME J EVERY J NO J MOST J FEW J EXACTLY-ONE 
To evaluate a quantificational formula Q(z, 1/1, .,p) , we randomly extend the input with z, 
then update with the restrictor 1/1 to get an intermediate state R, and then update with the 
scope .,p to get another intermediate state S. The output should be those world-sequence 
pairs i from the input such that the relevant quantifier relation Q holds between two sets, 
the set of values z is mapped to after update in the restrictor, and the set of values it is 
mapped to after update with the scope. First a semi-formal version, and then the definition 
proper16 ;  
I[Q(z, I/I, .,p)]J iff 3R, S 
I randomly extended with z and updated with 1/1 gives R 
and R updated with .,p gives S, and 
J = {i E I J Q ( values z takes � extens�ons of � �n R ) }  values z takes 10 extensIons of , 10 S 
Definition D23 (Externally static binary quantifiers) For Q one of EVERY , NO , MOST, 
FEW : 
I[Q(z, 1/1, .,p)]J iff 3R, S I +zo[I/I] R[.,p]S A 
J - { i E I J Q ( {d J 3 (w, f) E R (w, f) � i A fez) = d} ) }  - {d J 3 (w, /) E S (w, /) � i A fez) = d} 
This definition produces quantifiers which are internally dynamic (cf. [GS91b] ) , in the 
sense that discourse markers introduced in the restrictor can become bound in expressions 
l6 For dilCUB8ion of dynamic generalised quantifiers the reader is referred to [Ch92] .  In common with 
the definitions he providel, the dymnamic quantifiero defined here will all be con •• Ml4ti". regardle," of the 
conservativity of the underlying quantifier relation. Aloo observe that the 10 called proportion probl.m doe. 
not arise with this definition, becaWle we are explicitly counting over object. in the domain rather than 
assignment functions: lee [Ro81J for dilCUB8ion. 
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in the scope. However, these dynamic quantifiers are ezternally static: they do not have 
any net effect of introducing new discourse markers. But it is not too difficult to use the 
above definition as the basis of one for quantifiers which are both internally and externally 
dynamic. In the following definition, the subset of world-sequence pairs in the input state 
which are compatible with the quantification is calculated as before, and stored in a variable 
T. The output J is calculated by taking all those world-sequence pairs from S (the state 
resulting from random extension and update with both restrictor and scope) which are 
extesnions of world-sequence pairs in T: 
Definition D24 (Externally dynamic binary quantifiers)  For Q one of S O M E ,  
EXACTLY-ONE : 
I[Q(z , 1/>, 1I» ] J  iff 3R, 5, T I +"o[I/>] R[1I>] 5  1\ 
T - {i E I I Q (  {d I 3 (w, !) E R (w, !) � i 1\ f(z) = d} ) }  {d I 3 (w, f) E S (w, !) � i 1\ fez) = d} 
1\ J = {s E 5 I 3t E T s � t} 
Space does not permit me to discuss these quantifier definitions at length, but the interested 
reader should be able to confirm that they behave as dynamic generalized quantifiers should, 
supporting donkey anaphora and so forth. The following fact confirms that at least the 
dynamic generalized quantifiers sOMEand EVERY stand in the expected relation with the 
unary quantifiers 3 and V: 
Fact F6 (Properties of version 1 quantifiers) Assuming standard interpretations for 
SOME and EVERY :  
[SOME( Z, 1/>, 11>)] = 
[EVERY ( z, 1/>, 11» ] 
[3z /\ I/> 1\ 11>] 
['Vz I/> -+ 11>] 
It is relatively easy to see from the above definitions that a quantificational update of a 
state I with [Q(z, 1/>, 11» ]  will be defined only provided that there are intermediary states R 
and 5 such that I +"o[I/>] R[1I>] 5. But this will be the case if and only if an update from I 
with 3z I/> 1\ 11> is defined. Thus all the quantifiers given by the above definitions will tend 
to yield universal presupppositions just as with the earlier unary quantifiers, and in conflict 
with the empirical claims made in §2 .  
Fact F7 (Heimian projection from quantified contexts)  Ifl/> presupposes 11>,  then (for 
Q a quantifier): 
Q( z, 1/>, X) presupposes Vz 11> 
Q( z, x, 1/» presupposes Vz X -+ 11> 
4.2 Modal Heimian Quantifier Logic 
Definition D25 (Syntax of MHQL) As for HQL but with the following additional rewrite 
rule: 
FORM => (OFORM ) I ( DFORM ) 
The might operator (here 0) introduced in the update semantics of [Ve9 1] is a consistency 
test. Intuitively, 01/> will be satisfied in an information state just in case I/> is still an open 
possibility in that information state. The open possibilities, in this sense, are all the formulae 
with which the information state can be updated without yieldin absurdity. So, a formula 
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is consistent with a state if updating with the formula produces a non-absurd state, and 
is inconsistent with a state if updating produces absurdity. A formula is consistent in case 
there is some state it is consistent with: 
Definition 026 (Consistency) 
¢ is cOn8istent with I iff 3J I[¢] J " J =1- 1  : -( 1 
¢ is incon8istent with I iff 3J I[¢] J " J = 1 : -( 1 
¢ is co1l.8istent iff 31 ¢ is cOn8istent with I 
Veltman's might operator is defined in a semantics where formuale are interpreted as func­
tions from sets of worlds to sets of worlds. Thus exactly how the definition should be 
carried over to a semantics where formulae are interpreted as binary relations between sets 
of world-sequence pairs is partly a matter of taste. However, having expressed the desired 
interpretation of the operator in terms of the general notion of consistency rather than in 
the particular space of semantic denotations used by Veltman, the following definitions for 
o and its dual 0 become natural: 
Definition 027 (Epistemic Modals) 
I[O¢]J iff (J = I " ¢ is cOn8istent with I) 
V (J = 1 : -( 1 " ¢ is incomistent with I) 
[D¢] [...,O...,¢] 
Above, I called the might operator a con8istency test. In fact test-hood is given a technical 
interpretation in [Ve9 1] , which is easily adapted to the current setting. A formula is a teat 
just in case updating a state with that formula is possible, and either has no effect (the 
output being identical to the input) or produces absurdity. The tautologies form a special 
class of trivial tests which always I1.Icceed, and the inconsistent formulae form another trivial 
class which always fail. 
Definition 028 (Test ) 
¢ is a te,t iff VI, J I[¢]J � (I = J V J = [i]) 
The following properties are easily verified, and provide some indication of how the modals 
behave17: 
Fact F8 (Properties of modals) 
1 .  For any ¢, O¢ is a te,t. 
t. For any non-tautological ¢ admitted by at leallt ,one ,tate, O¢ is not per,istent. 
17Note that the fact that O. i. typically not persistent provides an easy way (cf. F2) to construct a 
formula which does not entail it. presuppositions: D(z, OB(II)) A �B(V) � OP(II). The premise denotes 
a function from .tates where z and V are defined and where II being Broke i. an open possibility, to states 
where '" has at some earlier point Discovered that II being broke is an open possibility, but where in fact 
II i. not Broke. TIms OP(V) is presupposed but not entailed by D(z, OB(V)) A �B(II). I mention this 
example just for it. technical interest: I cannot say that it reflects any strong empirical intuitions about 
presupposed statements of modality. 
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3. D� tests satisfaction. ie. 
I[D�] J iff (J = I " I F �) 
V (J = I : -( I " I '¢= � " I admits �) 
Quantifying-in to modalities has long been a source of philosophical and technical difficulty, 
and many of the problems that occur when modalities are imported into a dynamic logic are 
already present in the more familiar static setting of standard modal predicate logic. The 
following HMQL fact seems to contradict Kripke's arguments about the non-contingency of 
identity in modal predicate logics: 
Fact F9 (Modal identity is non-Kripkean) 
O(z = y) 
O(-'(z = y)) 
I would argue that, contrary to appearances, this property does not actually con:8ict with 
Kripke's intuitions, since the modalities in HMQL are intended to be interpreted as epis­
temic modalities, concerning the epistemic state of an agent gathering information, whereas 
Kripke's arguments concern metaphysical modality. Briefiy, in a metaphysical setting, if 
the possibility of two individuals being identical remains, then there is no way to dis­
tinguish them, and Kripke is just being a good Leibnizian in providing arguments that 
O(z = y) F z = y. But in an epistemic setting, such an argument would be disastrous. 
When we allow for the possibility of individuals we have experienced in different guises being 
the same, we may also allow for the possibility that they tum out to be different 18: 
E24 a .  The fi rst lady i s  not spyi ng 
b .  -,spyi ng( z )  
E25 a .  I can see a woma n  i n  the Whitehouse 
b .  SOME (y, woma n(y) , i-see-in-w(y)) 
E26 a .  S h e  might be  spyi ng. 
b .  Ospyin g(y) 
E27 a .  However. s h e  might b e  the first lady. 
b .  O(y = z) 
Such discourses create problems in the system of Dynamic Modal Predicate Logic of van 
Eijck and Ceparello [EC92] , which, although it has epistemic pretensions, uses an essentially 
Kripkean notion of modal identity. In DMPL the natural translation of the discourse would 
be inconsistent, whereas in the current system the sequenced conjunction of the above 4 
LFs yields a consistent formula, according with our intuition that the discourse is indeed 
consistent. 
SO, HMQL has its good points, but, as the following example demonstrates, it is far from 
perfect. Recall the financial situation introduced in §3: of the Men II and h, II was Broke 
in worlds '101 and 'I02and b was Broke in '101 but not in '102 . I am now in a position to reveal 
that the woman c's finances are healthy in both possible worlds. For the following example, 
assume the extension of Person includes all three individuals in both worlds: 
11 In my Rochester presentation. I gave a oemantica for definite descriptions. and thus a more realistic 
tranalation for this example. The interested reader is referred to (Be93bl . where the II&IDe example is treated 
more thoroughly. 
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E28 Everybody might be broke. (narrow scope might reading) 
HMQL translation: EVERY(Z, P(z), OB(z» 
Denotation: Given an input I, We begin by finding states R and S such that 1 +., 
o[P(z)]R[OB(z)] S. In this particular model, all individuals are in the extension 
of Person in every world, so R contains all the z-extensions of the input. 
Since 0 is a test and there is no possibility here of presupposition failure, updating 
with OB(z) can have only two results: if B(z) is consistent with R then S = R, 
otherwise S = I : -( I· If at least one individual is in the extension of Broke in 
some world-sequence pair in R (and not otherwise), then B(z) will be consistent 
with R, so S = R. But if S = R then clearly every extension of an input world­
sequence pair in R will also be in S. In this case, all input world-sequence pairs 
will be compatible with the quantifier associated with EVERY, i.e. the superset 
relation. So, if at least one individual is in the extension of Broke in at least 
one input world-sequence pair, then all world sequence pairs in the input will be 
preserved on the output. On the other hand, if no individuals are in the extension 
of Broke in any input world-sequence pairs, a similar argument shows that the 
result of updating will be I : -( I: no input world-sequence pairs will be compatible 
with the quantifier. 
So, the output is identical to the input iffor some input pair at least one individual 
in the extension of P is also in the extension of B, and otherwise the output is BJ· 
Sample Update: 1 : -) 1 .. -+-) I 
The update of I : -) I with EVERY(Z,  P(z), OB(z» is not as informative as we would wish, 
since it leaves us in the same state of blissful ignorance that we started in. Given that there 
is at least one individual, namely c who is definitely not Broke in I :-) I, it seems that the 
claim that everybody might be broke contradicts the initial information, and should produce 
a state of absurdity. Thus the denotation does not accord with intuition. 
More generally, a statement EVERY (Z, tP, O,p) should state that for each individual such 
that tP holds, we do not know to the contrary of ,p,  but in fact ,  under the current HMQL 
semantics, it only states something much weaker19 :  
Fact FlO (Improper quantifying-in) 20 
If I F SOME(Z,  tP, O,p) ,  then I F EVERY(Z, tP, <>1/1) 
19 The problem identified by FlO also arises in other attempts to combine a Groenendijk .... d Stokhof style 
analysis of quantification ....d ..... phora with a Veltman style analysis of epistemic modality, such as those 
in [Ver92, De93] . See [GSV94] for a closely related solution to that presented here, .... d also & far more 
elaborate discuasion of Veltman's might operator. 
20 The proof uses the following lemmas, deriving from the definitions of test-hood, satisfaction, conjunction 
.... d negation: 
Ll If .p i. II t •• t, 1 1= '; A .p  lI .. d 1[';] 1, th ... 1 I= .p. 
L2 If 1[';] 1 lI .. d 1 It: .p, th ... 1 It: '; A .p. 
La If 1 It: .; lind 1 IIdmits .;, th ... 1 1= �.;. 
(1 )  1 1= SOMB(%, ';, <>,p) hypothesis 
F6, associativity of 3 (2) 1 1= (3% ';) A <>.p 
(3) H 1[3% ';] 1 then 
1 1= <>,p 
(4) H 1[3% ';] 1  then 
1 It: <>�.p 
(5) 1 It: (3% ';) A �<>,p 
(6) 1 1= �(3% '; A �<>,p) 
(7) 1 1= (3% ';) - <>,p 
(S) 1 1= BVBRY(%, ';, <>,p) 
Lemma Ll, test-hood of <> (FS) 
defns. of 1=, <>, � 
Lemma L2 
Lemma L3, admission of 3% '; guar .... teed by (2) 
defn. of implication 
F6 
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5 Conclusion 
5 . 1  The Problem 
My reading of the problem is as follows: variables are not varying enough in quan­
tification. Instead of ranging over alternative members of the domain, the use of random 
extension means that a variable is interpreted as a single underspecified object. This can 
be clarified in terms of the notion of a po.6ible property: 
Definition D29 (Possible Properties) 
1. :z: hlU po •• ible value d in I iff 3(w, I) E I I(:z:) = d 
!. P i6 a po •• ible property o/ :z: in I iff 3(w, I) E I P(:z:) i6 true wrt. (w, I) 
3. P i6 a po.sible property 01 the :z:-value d in I iff 3 (w,  I) E I I(:z:) = d and P(:c) i6 
true wrt. (w, I) 
Regarding epistemic modality, the fact that variables are interpreted as underspecified ob­
jects makes them unsuitable for talking about possible properties of the individual domain 
members. Since a variable :z: might be any member of the domain amongst its possible 
values, it has as possible properties the union of all the possible properties of its possible 
values. Intuitively, if we want to know whether a quantification Q(:z:, q" OP(:z:» is satis­
fied, we should not be looking at whether an underspecified :z: has P as one of its possible 
properties, but at whether the different x-values have possible property P. 
The other side of the coin, which affects presupposition, concerns what I will call the set of 
nece •• ary values of a variable or of a value that that variable can take: 
Definition D30 (Necessary Properties) 
1. P i6 a neceuary property o/ :z: in I iff V(w, I) E I P(:z:) i6 true wrt. (w, /) 
!. P i6 a nece.,ary property 01 the :z:-value d in I iff V(w, I) E I I(:z:) = d and P(:z:) 
i6 true wrt. (w,  I) 
The only properties that a variable mU6t have in an information state, are the properties 
that its values are established to have. So, just as the set of possible properties of a variable 
is the union of the possible properties of its values, the set of necessary properties of a 
variable is the intersection of the necessary properties of its values. When a quantifier binds 
a presupposition trigger, update is only defined if the presupposition is established to hold. 
Thus, for a quantification Q(:z:, q" D(:z:, P(:z:))) to define an update, P must be amongst the 
necessary properties of :z: in the local context where D(:z:, P(:z:» is evaluated. But this will 
only be the case if all of the values of :z: have P as a necessary property. This is what 
produces the universal presupposition. 
5 . 2  The Solution 
Perhaps I have laboured the point somewhat. But it is an important point. To solve 
the problems both with presupposition and with epistemic modality, what is needed is a 
re-interpretation of variables, so that they do not act as underspecified objects within quan­
tificational contexts. So, to make DMQL work properly, we need to change the semantics of 
quantification such that the values that variables take are considered one at a time instead 
of all at once. 
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I will present this alternative semantics as a minor modification of the earlier definitions, 
since this clarifies exactly what the differences are. To look at the values a variable takes 
one at a time, I will define a way to slice up an information state with respect to the values 
taken by a particular variable: 
Definition D31 (Slicing) 
1",:d = ((w, f) E I I I(:z:) = d} 
Thus 1",:d ,  the dth :z:-slice 01 I, contains all the world-sequence pairs in I which give :z: the 
value d. To update a state with a formula looking at the values of a variable :z: one at a 
time, we use the sliced meaning of the formula with respect to :z: :  
Definition D32 (Sliced Meanings) 
1[<1>].1 iff 3d E V 1d admits <I> II 
J = U{K 1 3d E Vld [<I>] K} 
An update from I to J with the sliced meaning of a formula w.r.t. :z: is obtained by 
cutting up I into each of it's 1",:d slices, updating each of these slices with the formula 
to get a set of output slices, and then gluing all the slices back together (by taking their 
union) to produce the combined output J. Additionally, there is a definedness condition 
3d E V Id admits <I> which must be satisfied in order for update with the sliced meaning to 
occur. This condition is what will ultimately lead to quantifiers yielding existential rather 
than universal presuppositions. 
Minor surgery is sufficient to repair the problems with the version 1 semantics. The original 
semantics for HPL's unary existential quantifier, in D21, was: 
1[3:z: <I>]J iff 1 +",0[<1>] J 
To modify this definition so that the values of variables are considered one at a time, the 
occurrence of [<I>] is simply replaced with [<I>t to give: 
Definition D33 (HPL Existential) (Version 2) 
1[3:z: <I>]J iff I +",o[<I>t J 
A similar modification needs to be made to the semantics of binary quantifiers (D23 and 
D24) : the occurences of [<I>] and [,p] are replaced with [<I>t and [,pt respectively. This gives 
the following final definitions: 
Definition D34 (Externally static binary quantifiers) (Ver8ion 2) 
I[Q(:z:, <1>, ,p)]J iff 3R, S I +",0[<I>tR[,pt5 II 
J - { i E l l Q ( {d I 3 (w, f) E R (w, f) � i II I(:z:) = d} ) }  {d I 3 (w, /) E S (w, /) � i II I(:z:) = d} 
Definition D35 (Externally dynamic binary quantifiers) (Version 2) 
For Q one O/ SOME , 
EXACTLY-ONE : 
I[Q(:z:, <I>, ,p})J iff 3R, 5, T I +",0[<I>tR[,pt5 II 
T - { i E I I Q ( {d 1 3 (w, I) E R (w , I) � i II I(:z:) = d} ) }  {d I 3(w, /) E S (w, /) � i II I(:z:) = d} 
II J = {8 E 5 1 3t E T s  � t} 
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5 . 3  Results 
Under the new semantics, F5 and F7, which state that the unary and binary quantifiers yield 
universal presuppositions, no longer hold. We retain, however, existential presuppositions 
from quantified contexts21 : 
Fact F l l  (Existential projection from quantified contexts)  Ifr/J presupposell .,p, then 
(for Q a quantifier and true any tautology): 
Q(z, r/J, X) presupposes SOME(Z,  true, .,p)  
Q(z,  X, ,p) presupposes SOME (Z,  X, .,p) 
The problematic result in F l O, showing that quantifying-in to an epistemic modality did 
not have the desired effects, no longer holds under the version 2 semantics. So, for in­
stance, regarding the financial model discussed earlier, it is now the case that 1 : -) 1 1=  
S OME (Z, P(z), OB(z» but I : -) I � EVERY (Z,  P(z) ,  OB(z». This is as we would expect: 
there is an individual who might be Broke in I : -) I (in fact there are two, a and b) , but 
it is not the case that everybody might be Broke (since c is definitely not Broke.) Thus 
the denotation specified for E28 is completely altered, and in particular the sample up­
date 1 : -) 1 ..... 1 : -) I will not be in the denotation of EVERY(Z, P(z) ,  OB(z» under the new 
semantics. 
5 . 4  Discussion 
Since only predicate logics have been defined, with no formal mechanism for relating sen­
tences of natural language to formulae of these logics, I cannot claim to have provided here a 
fully compositional treatment of the interaction between presupposition, epistemic modality 
and quantification. However, in [Be93bj it is shown how logics like those considered here 
can be embedded into a three sorted variant of classical type theory, and how this can be 
used to define a compositional grammar in the style of Montague. 
Apart from providing an improved treatment of epistemic modality, the system offers a 
treatment of a range of problems from the presupposition literature. For instance, quantifiers 
can bind presuppositions, unlike in Karttunen and Peters' system [KP79j . Their problems 
resulted from the decision to split meanings into separate assertive and presuppositional 
components. There is no such split in the current system: presupposition and assertion 
are simply different aspects of a single (dynamic) meaning. In addition, all the empirical 
21 By adjusting the admisaion conditionin the definition of diced " ... ming D32, alternativepresuppositional 
behavior would be produced, so I CBmlot claim that the existential presuppositions are motivated just by 
having chosen to look at the values of varia.bles one at a time. Rather, I would have to .ay that interpreting 
variables in this way gave the flexibility needed to remove the universal presuppositions in the first version 
of the semantics. It would be possible to uae different definitions of slicing for different quantffiera, if there 
were evidence that the different quantifiers had different presuppositional properties. In §2 of this paper, 
no evidence was found that the different quantificational determiners varied in this respect, but I .uapect 
that some may find the conclusion that no quantifiers yield universal presuppositions comraversial. Such 
people are welcome to use the general framework provided here to refonnulate the admission conditions as 
they see fit. 
Also the contention that presupposition triggers in the restrictor of a universal do not lead to universal 
presuppositions i. perhaps lea. contraversial than the claim that presupposition triggers in the scope of a 
universal do not lead to universal presuppositions. So some might wish to advocate different admission 
conditions for the slice operation used in the restrict or of a quantifier than in the scope. 
However, note that the uncontentious empirical observation in §1.6 means that the admission condition 
CBmlot be removed altogether. If there were not at least an existential requirement, that for some value of 
the quantified variable update is defined, then unbound presupposition triggers within the syntactic scope 
of a quantifier would no longer constrain the input context to the quantifier. 
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requirements of §2 are met in the modified semantics for HMQL. I leave it to the reader to 
verify this last claim, perhaps by considering the denotations of formulae corresponding to 
the various different examples presented there. 
Can we draw any general morals? A first moral is that there has been a serious lack of 
empirical study into the interaction of presupposition and quantification, and that conse­
quently theorists have been largely operating in the dark. The conclusions drawn in §2 
I hope will prove contraversial, for perhaps that would convince others to perform more 
extensive surveys of their own. Are there, as I have assumed, even any existential presuppo­
sitions? The discourses in § 2  are organised in such a way as to reveal the minimal semantic 
constraints needed to avoid presupposition failure. When informants are presented with a 
single sentence example, and asked about whether they would make various inferences on 
the basis of the example, they will usually make stronger inferences than those given by the 
minimal semantic constraint. Why? Are there other presuppositional mechanisms at work 
apart from the minimal precondition for update that I have discussed in this paper? There 
is clearly much empirical work still to be done. 
Secondly, perhaps it has been demonstrated that traditional problems of modal predicate 
logic, albeit dragged into the barely-Tarskian world of dynamic semantics, are still of rele­
vance. The admittedly rather superficial digression into the semantics of epistemic modality 
has, I hope, shed additional light on the nature of variables. In particular it has shown that 
whilst a measure of discourse-marker-ness is useful, it should not be taken too far. Vari­
ables within the scope of their introducing quantifier do not appear to behave as discourse 
markers. They should not be interpreted as single underspecified individuals but rather as 
place-markers for each of the individuals being quantified over. 
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